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A counter-example to SSI and contextualism			
Section 1: DeRose's and Stanley's proposals        	  I present a counter-example aim at two targets: Contextualism (specifically, DeRose's version), and Stanley's Subject-Sensitive Invariantism.1 The example is a variation on DeRose's bank case.
   On DeRose's account, the truth conditions of knowledge ascriptions depend on the context of the ascriber, and specifically on a feature of that context, which is its standard.2 For DeRose, the truth conditions of knowledge ascriptions in a particular ascriptional context depend on the comparative levels of the subject's epistemic position and the standard of the ascriber's context: For a knowledge ascription to count as true at such a context, the subject's epistemic position must be significantly higher than the ascriptional standard.3 The ascriptional context (leaving skeptical contexts out) would vary though with the importance, or stakes, that the ascriber takes the case to hold for the subject.4 
    Thus, in DeRose's seminal bank case, the husband, in the first part of the example (before his wife mentions the importance of a timely deposit), says 'I know that the bank is open on Saturday', which DeRose takes to count as true at that context. In the second stage, the husband retracts, and on DeRose's formulation he says at that stage that he doesn't know that the bank is open on Saturday, which DeRose again takes to count as true at that second context. These two responses5 evoked considerable consent. Stanley would take them to be 'intuitively right'.6 DeRose's main point of accounting for these intuitions is to propose his above schema for truth conditions for knowledge ascriptions, according to which the knowledge ascription in question counts as true at the ascriptional context in case, roughly, the epistemic position of the subject is significantly higher than the standard of that context. In this example, the husband's epistemic position is roughly medium-high in both stages, whereas the standard of the context is low in the first stage, but high in the second stage. Consequently, the first self-knowledge ascription by the husband comes out as counting as true in the first stage, whereas his denial comes out as true in the second context. This fits an intuitive reaction whereby the husband's response at the first stage counts as true (to use DeRose's expression), whereas his denial of the knowledge ascription in question in the second stage counts as false.   
   On Stanley's SSI account (supported, at least in spirit, it seems, by Hawthorne), the truth conditions of knowledge ascriptions don't invoke context dependence, but invoke the stakes of the subject regarding the proposition in question (specified by the content clause of the knowledge ascription in question).7 For the knowledge ascription to be true, the subject's epistemic position must be significantly higher than the stakes. DeRose's bank example exhibits low stakes in the first stage, and high stakes in the second stage.8 Accordingly, the intuition that the husband knows in the first stage but doesn't know in the second stage (reflected in our assent to the husband's responses in both cases – where they would count as 'intuitively right') is backed up by his fixed medium-high epistemic position regarding the proposition in question (that the bank is open on Saturday), with the stakes being low first and high later.
Section 2: The counter-example             On the counter-example I propose, which is a variant on the bank case, the participants are the husband (a counterpart of DeRose in his own example), myself and my friend. It can be carved out into three stages. The first and second stages track DeRose's example. The three of us are in the car, with DeRose driving, on the way to the airport, on a Friday. The plan is for DeRose to deposit a check at his bank, which is on the way to the airport, and for him then to drop me and my friend at the airport. We notice the long line at the bank. I suggest to DeRose that he postpones the deposit for Saturday. DeRose then asks me: "Do you know that the bank is open on Saturday?" I respond: "Yes, it is open on Saturday." (In the original example, the husband responds is more explicit, such as: "Yes, I do, it's open on Saturday" – explicitly (even if anaphorically) asserting that he knows. Either formulation would do.)9 
   In the second stage, DeRose proceeds to explain the importance of the timely deposit of the check, pointing out that the following day (Saturday) is the deadline for the deposit. He then asks me again: "So do you know that the bank is open on Saturday?" I now respond by saying: "In this case, I don't know that it's open on Saturday. Why won't you then stop at the bank and deposit."10 
    While I am talking, DeRose's cell phone rings. DeRose takes the call, realizes it's a private call, stops the car, and steps out of the car (closing the door) to proceed privately with the call. Before he steps out, he mentions that he must attend to the call, and that we will resolve the deposit matter when he returns.
    Now comes the third stage (with no parallel in DeRose's original example). My friend, I notice, although very sympathetic to DeRose concern about his house, is more concerned that I am about getting to the airport in time. He approaches me and says: "I don't understand. First you asserted that the bank is open on Saturday, then you took it back. But DeRose didn't give you any evidence one way or another regarding this matter. So why did you change your mind? Do you or don't you know that the bank is open on Saturday?" Throughout our exchange, DeRose is out of range and can't hear us. I respond: "Yes, the bank is open on Saturday. But I was concerned that if I didn't retract, DeRose might proceed to the airport, planning to deposit the check on Saturday. I share completely DeRose's worry about his house, I didn't want to take responsibility for a very bad outcome, and I wanted DeRose to stop and make the deposit. This is why I retracted." 
   At this point, DeRose is finished with his call, comes back to the car, and says: "Sorry about that. Due to the call, I was distracted while you answered my question. So let's now make a decision when to deposit the check. Can you (aiming at me) repeat what you said?" I repeat my retraction, and DeRose says: "So then let us do as you suggest, and deposit the check now." 
Section 3: The upshot of the counter-example             I take it that my responses in the first and second stage are no less intuitive than were the husband's responses in DeRose's original example: DeRose would take them to count as true at the contexts in question, and Stanley would take them to be intuitively right, and also intuitively true. My assertion to my friend, in the third stage, to the effect that the bank is open on Saturday, is also quite intuitive – is intuitively right, and similarly counts as true at that context. Yet, considering Stanley, the stakes for me (the subject of the self-knowledge ascription) didn't change from the second to the third stage: DeRose's being able to retain his house remained important for me, out of sympathy and care for DeRose, and to the same extent in both stages. So my stakes in the matter have hardly changed. Nor has my epistemic position – I have not been provided with any additional evidence regarding the bank's opening hours. But with these two features remaining the same, the truth values of my retracting assertion in the second stage and my re-assertion in the third stage should come out as having the same truth value, on Stanley's account.11  And intuitively they do. But on Stanley's account, my response in the second stage (retracting my self-knowledge ascription) comes out as true, whereas my response in the third stage comes out as false, since at that third stage I assert that the bank is open on Saturday, whereas my stakes (regarding that proposition) remain high and my epistemic position remains medium high.
    Regarding DeRose's account, the standard of the context in the third stage remains high: It was, as DeRose argued, high in the second stage (the second stage being a mirror image of DeRose's second stage of his own original version). But the features that drove it to be high in the second stage remain intact in the third stage: My empathy and identification with DeRose and the fate of his house have not changed one bit from the second to the third stage, and thus the importance of this concern has not changed for me. Hence, since, on DeRose's account, my denial (of the self-knowledge ascription) in the second stage counts as true, my re-assertion that the bank is open on Saturday in the third stage should come out as counting as false – with a stark contrast to our intuition regarding the matter. Hence this case comes out as a counter-example to DeRose's and Stanley's accounts of the truth-conditions of knowledge- ascriptions. 
Section 4: Objections                Is the context in the third stage the same context as in the second stage? The only potential difference between the two stages is the departure of DeRose from the conversation. Yet there is no reason in general to assume that any departure of one party to a three-party conversation changes the conversational context. What if a party doesn't depart, but becomes distracted, and doesn't attend to the conversation? Yet the more weighty response is that the features of the context at the third stage, regardless of how the above issue is resolved, yield the outcome that, on DeRose's account, my affirmation that the bank is open on Saturday doesn't count as true at that context since the standard remains high – it doesn't change significantly between the second and third context. Nor has my epistemic position change. Hence the counter-example holds.
    Does the third stage count as a deliberational setting?12 The example above was designed so that the joint decision hasn't been made until DeRose returns to the car and resumes the discussion. The deliberational setting therefore doesn't end with his departure from the car to take the call. Further, the third stage is still in a deliberational setting, since my friend's challenge should be construed as challenging, to a certain extent, my suggestion that we stop at the bank: he is more concerned than I am about the delay in arriving at the airport. The intuitions associated with my response to DeRose in the second stage or to my friend in the third stage aren't affected if my friend made his challenge to me regarding my changing my mind has also the thrust of being a challenge to my position regarding the impending joint decision. My friend may well be less inclined to oppose stopping at the bank (being afraid that we miss our flight) than I am, and may align his challenge to me to reflect such a position, e.g., by saying: "Why did you change your mind? Aren't you concerned about our flight?" Such a modified response wouldn't affect the intuitive status of my response to him, but would keep the deliberational setting explicitly open. 


























1. Yet note that Stanley is more tentative regarding the schema for truth conditions that he offers, and he himself points out a few examples where these truth conditions don't hold up – in particular, the high-attributor/low subject case (i.e., his variation with Bill), as well as temporal, counterfactual, and modal cases. I show how the pragmatic approach above accounts for these cases in "The Pragmatic Role of Knowledge and Semantic Intuitions", and "The Vicarious Role of the Audience, Audiences as Rational Advisors, and Pragmatic Inconsistencies" (drafts). 
2. This conception plays a major role for DeRose in his proposed treatment of skepticism. But this aspect of his account falls outside the scope of this paper. In my view, when applied to skepticism, the issue is epistemic retraction rather than pragmatic retraction, which the phenomenon discussed in this paper.
3. DeRose doesn't seem to provide precise specification for the comparison between these two parameters. Yet even such a rough characterization would suffice for the counter-example I offer below to hold.
4. DeRose's formulation of the bank example does include some skeptical element, where the wife, in her response, mentioned that banks sometimes change their opening hours. This is a way of pointing out to an error possibility. 
Yet the force of the example, and the intuitions it evokes, would not change significantly if this element is dropped, which attests to its relatively minor and non-essential contribution to the overall thrust of the example. On its own, the intuitions in the bank case would not hold if only this aspect is evoked in the wife's response (that is, if she doesn't mention the danger of failing to meet the mortgage deadline): I expect that in such case the husband's response would be dismissive rather than retraction. I differ from DeRose regarding whether skeptical and importance (or stakes) considerations call for a combined treatment, such as the contextualist treatment, since, on my view, pragmatic retractions and skeptical retractions are very different phenomena, calling for very different treatments – pragmatic and semantic/cognitive treatments respectively, and should be pulled apart and each explained on its own terms.
5. I happen to disagree, especially regarding the full-scale retraction counting as true, but also whether the husband's assertion 'I know the bank is open on Saturday' at the first stage counts as true at that stage (on my account of KK, only 'The bank is open on Saturday' is epistemically assertible by him). Regarding the full-scale retraction in the second stage, on my view it's neither epistemically assertible nor true (leaving aside pragmatic aspects). But DeRose can still make his point here, given his endorsement of Williamson's knowledge norm of assertion, even if he were to appeal to a milder retraction, and so I will not belabor this point here. See my "Embedded Knowledge" (draft). 
6. That is, as the husband's assertions. I would assume Stanley to expect that responders, when questioned about "Does the husband know that the bank is open on Saturday?" on the two occasions would take him to know in the first occasion but not to know on the second. (One perhaps can ask different responders the question regarding the two stages, presented in isolation, if one is concerned by a carry-on effect of the first question on the second. In general, we know empirically that order of questions of this sort does impact responders' answers, which may seem to invoke a framing effect. Stanley may consider it as a 'framing' effect that superimposes on the stakes' effect. The intuitions that the example is supposed to invoke would have an effect in the same direction as the supposed framing effect, and thus would, presumably, for contextualism and SSI, interfere with what they perceive to be the phenomenon of the effects of the ascriber's context or the subject's stakes on the standard.) 
7. Stanley takes the account to hold in a deliberational setting.
8. I skirt here the important issue of the difference between objective and perceived stakes. The example can be modified to suit either variant.
9. I prefer the weaker one, since it would do: Given appropriate version of the Knowledge Norm of Assertion, on the basis of the evidence, it is assertible.
10. An alternative formulation of my response in the example would be: "In this case, I can't say that I know that the bank is open." This assertion is indeed assertible. The formulation that DeRose uses is not, on my position, epistemically assertible. Whether it is overall assertible depends on how much weight the husband needs to place on his assertion in order for it to be effective. This would vary with various ways of filling up the example, and is not central to our point here. 
11. If we are to resort to the original formulation of the example by DeRose, then my response could be formulated as: "I then don't know now that the bank is open on Saturday". If this response is true (or count as true) in the first stage, then it is true (or count as true) in the third stage, since neither the contextual standard nor my (the subject's) stakes have changed.
12. I take a deliberational setting to be one in which a decision and/or action is being contemplated and drive, or lurk behind, the conversation (or private monologue). 
13. When DeRose and I are in agreement about depositing now at the end, the majority has decided what to do. 
14. Playing with open cards is spelling out one's evidence and rational considerations, if any, that underpin the assertion. For a more elaborate discussion of the open cards/closed cards distinction, see my "No Pragmatic Encroachment for 'Know': Its Steering Role in Practical Inference" (manuscript).



